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Abstract
We study privacy-preserving query answering in
Description Logics (DLs). Specifically, we con-
sider the approach of controlled query evaluation
(CQE) based on the notion of instance indistin-
guishability. We derive data complexity results
for query answering over DL-LiteR ontologies,
through a comparison with an alternative, exist-
ing confidentiality-preserving approach to CQE.
Finally, we identify a semantically well-founded
notion of approximated query answering for CQE,
and prove that, for DL-LiteR ontologies, this form
of CQE is tractable with respect to data complex-
ity and is first-order rewritable, i.e., it is always re-
ducible to the evaluation of a first-order query over
the data instance.
1 Introduction
We consider controlled query evaluation (CQE), a declara-
tive framework for privacy-preserving query answering in-
vestigated in the literature on knowledge representation and
database theory [Sicherman et al., 1983; Bonatti et al., 1995;
Biskup, 2000]. The basic idea of CQE is defining a data pro-
tection policy through logical statements. Consider for in-
stance an organization that wants to keep confidential the fact
that it has suppliers involved in both Project A and Project
B. This can be expressed over the information schema of the
organization through a denial assertion of the form
∀x. Supplier(x) ∧ ProjA(x) ∧ ProjB(x)→ ⊥
In CQE, two different main approaches can be
identified. The first one [Biskup and Bonatti, 2004b;
Biskup and Bonatti, 2004a; Biskup and Weibert, 2008;
Benedikt et al., 2018; Benedikt et al., 2019;
Studer and Werner, 2014] models privacy preservation
through the notion of indistinguishable data instances. In
this approach, a system for CQE enforces data privacy if, for
every data instance I , there exists a data instance I ′ that does
not violate the data protection policy and is indistinguishable
from I for the user, i.e., for every user query q, the system
provides the same answers to q over I and over I ′. We
call this approach (instance) indistinguishability-based (IB).
In continuation of the previous example, in the presence
of an instance {Supplier(c),ProjA(c),ProjB(c)}, an IB
system should answer user queries as if the instance were,
e.g., {Supplier(c),ProjA(c)} (note that other instances not
violating the policy can be considered as indistinguishable,
e.g., {Supplier(c),ProjB(c)}).
The second approach [Bonatti and Sauro, 2013;
Cuenca Grau et al., 2013; Cuenca Grau et al., 2015] models
privacy preservation by considering the whole (possibly
infinite) set of answers to queries that the system provides
to the user. In this approach, a CQE system protects the
data if, for every data instance I , the logical theory corre-
sponding to the set of answers provided by the system to
all queries over I does not entail any violation of the data
protection policy. According to [Cuenca Grau et al., 2015],
we call this approach confidentiality-preserving (CP). In our
ongoing example, a CP system would entail, e.g., the queries
Supplier(c) ∧ ProjA(c) and ∃x.Supplier(x) ∧ ProjB(x), but
not also to the query Supplier(c) ∧ ProjB(c) (notice that the
choice is non-deterministic, and in our example the system
could have decided to disclose that c participates in Project B
and hide its participation in Project A).
In both approaches, the ultimate goal is to realize opti-
mal CQE systems, i.e., systems maximizing the answers re-
turned to user queries, still respecting the data protection pol-
icy. Traditionally, this aim has been pursued through the
construction of a single optimal censor, i.e., a specific im-
plementation of the adopted notion of privacy-preservation,
either IB or CP. Since, however, in both approaches several
optimal censors typically exist, this way of proceeding re-
quires to make a choice on how to obfuscate data, which,
in the absence of additional (preference) criteria, may result
discretionary. To avoid this, query answering over all opti-
mal censors has been recently studied (limited to the CP ap-
proach) [Cuenca Grau et al., 2013; Lembo et al., 2019].
Despite their similarities, the precise relationship between
the IB and CP approaches is still not clear and has not been
fully investigated yet. Also, query answering over all optimal
IB censors has not been previously studied. Moreover, among
the complexity results obtained and the techniques defined so
far for CQE, we still miss the identification of cases that are
promising towards its practical usage.
In this paper, we aim at filling some of the abovementioned
gaps in the context of Description Logic (DL) ontologies.1
We focus on the approach to CQE based on instance indis-
tinguishability (Section 3), and study its relationship with the
CP approach (Section 4). Specifically, we prove that the IB
approach to CQE in DLs corresponds to a particular instance
of the CP approach to CQE [Lembo et al., 2019]. Based on
such a correspondence, for ontologies specified in the well-
known DL DL-LiteR [Calvanese et al., 2007], we are able to
transfer some complexity results for query answering over all
optimal censors shown in [Lembo et al., 2019] to the case
of CQE under IB censors (Section 5). Such results show
that, even in the lightweight DL DL-LiteR, query answering
in the IB approach is intractable with respect to data com-
plexity, unless one relies on a single optimal censor chosen
non-deterministically in the lack of further meta-information
about the domain of the dataset.
To overcome the above problems and provide a practi-
cal, semantically well-founded solution, we define a quasi-
optimal notion of IB censor, which corresponds to the best
sound approximation of all the optimal IB censors (Section
6). We then prove that, in the case of DL-LiteR ontolo-
gies, query answering based on the quasi-optimal IB censor
is tractable with respect to data complexity and is reducible
to the evaluation of a first-order query over the data instance,
i.e., it is first-order rewritable. We believe that this result has
an important practical impact. Indeed, we have identified a
setting in which privacy-preserving query answering formal-
ized in a declarative logic-based framework as CQE, for a DL
(i.e., DL-LiteR) specifically designed for data management,
has the same data complexity as evaluating queries over a
database (i.e., AC0). This opens the possibility of defining al-
gorithms for CQE of practical usage, amenable to implemen-
tation on top of traditional (relational) data management sys-
tems, as in Ontology-based Data Access [Xiao et al., 2018].
2 Preliminaries
We use standard notions of function-free first-order (FO)
logic, and in particular we consider Description Log-
ics (DLs), which are fragments of FO using only unary
and binary predicates, called concepts and roles, respec-
tively [Baader et al., 2007]. We assume to have the pair-
wise disjoint countably infinite sets ΣC ,ΣR,ΣI and ΣV for
atomic concepts, atomic roles, constants (a.k.a. individuals),
and variables, respectively. A DL ontology O = T ∪ A is
constituted by a TBox T and an ABox A, specifying inten-
sional and extensional knowledge, respectively. The set of
atomic concepts and roles occurring in O is the signature of
O. The semantics of O is given in terms of FO models over
the signature of O, in the standard way [Baader et al., 2007].
In particular, we say that O is consistent if it has at least
one model, inconsistent otherwise. O entails an FO sen-
tence φ specified over the signature of O, denoted O |=
φ, if φ is true in every model of O. In this paper, we
consider ontologies expressed in DL-LiteR, the member of
1Privacy-preserving query answering in DLs has been in-
vestigated also in settings different from CQE: see, e.g.,
[Cuenca Grau and Horrocks, 2008; Calvanese et al., 2012;
Tao et al., 2014].
the DL-Lite family [Calvanese et al., 2007] which underpins
OWL 2 QL [Motik et al., 2012], i.e., the OWL 2 profile specifi-
cally designed for efficient query answering. A TBox T in
DL-LiteR is a finite set of axioms of the form B1 ⊑ B2
(resp., R1 ⊑ R2), denoting concept (resp., role) inclusion,
and B1 ⊑ ¬B2 (resp., R1 ⊑ ¬R2), denoting concept (resp.,
role) disjointness, where: R1, R2 are of the form P , with
P ∈ ΣR, or its inverse P−, and B1, B2 are of the form A,
with A ∈ ΣC , ∃P , or ∃P
−, i.e., unqualified existential re-
strictions, which denote the set of objects occurring as first or
second argument of P , respectively. An ABox A is a finite
set of ground atoms, i.e., assertions of the formA(a), P (a, b),
where A ∈ ΣC , P ∈ ΣR, and a, b ∈ ΣI . As usual in query
answering over DL ontologies, we focus on the language of
conjunctive queries. A Boolean conjunctive query (BCQ) q
is an FO sentence of the form ∃~x.φ(~x), where ~x are variables
in ΣV , and φ(~x) is a finite, non-empty conjunction of atoms
of the form α(~t), where α ∈ ΣC ∪ ΣR, and each term in ~t
is either a constant in ΣI or a variable in ~x. We denote by
Eval(q,A) the evaluation of a query q over (the model iso-
morphic to) an ABox A.
A denial assertion (or simply a denial) is an FO sentence of
the form ∀~x.φ(~x) → ⊥, such that ∃~x.φ(~x) is a BCQ. Given
one such denial δ and an ontologyO, we say that O ∪ {δ} is
consistent if O 6|= ∃~x.φ(~x), and is inconsistent otherwise.
In the following, with FO, CQ, and GA we denote
the languages of function-free FO sentences, BCQs, and
ground atoms, respectively, all specified over the alphabets
ΣC ,ΣR,ΣI , and ΣV . Given an ontology O and a language
L, with L(O) we refer to the subset of L whose sentences are
built over the signature of O and the variables in ΣV . For a
TBox T and a language L, we denote by clT
L
(·) the function
that, for an ABox A, returns all the sentences φ ∈ L(T ∪ A)
such that T ∪ A |= φ.
For the sake of presentation, we will limit our technical
treatment to languages containing only closed formulas, but
our results hold also for open formulas. In particular, the re-
sults on entailment of BCQs (see Sections 5 and 6) can be
extended to arbitrary (i.e., non-Boolean) CQs in the standard
way2. Our complexity results are for data complexity, i.e., are
w.r.t. the size of the ABox only.
3 CQE through instance indistinguishability
A CQE framework consists of a TBox T and a policy P over
T , i.e., a finite set of denial assertions over the signature of
T . An ABoxA for T is such thatA and T have the same sig-
nature. In the following, when a TBox T is given, we always
assume that the coupled policy is specified over T , that each
considered ABoxA is for T , and that, unless otherwise spec-
ified, T ∪A and T ∪P are consistent. A censor is a function
that alters query answers so that by uniting the answers (even
a possibly infinite set thereof) with the TBox a user can never
infer a BCQ ∃~x.φ(~x), for each denial ∀~x.φ(~x)→ ⊥ in P .
2It is also easy to see that, since DL-LiteR is insensitive to
the adoption of the unique name assumption (UNA) for CQ an-
swering [Artale et al., 2009], our results hold both with and without
UNA.
We here propose a notion of censor which is the natural ap-
plication to our framework of the analogous definitions given
in [Biskup and Bonatti, 2004b; Biskup and Weibert, 2008;
Benedikt et al., 2018; Benedikt et al., 2019]. The basic idea
of this approach is that for every underlying instance (an
ABox in our framework) and every query, a censor returns to
the user the same answers it would return on another (possi-
bly identical) instance that does not contain confidential data,
so that she cannot understand which of the two instances she
is querying. This is formalized as follows.
Definition 1 [Indistinguishability-based censor] Let T be a
DL TBox and P be a policy. An indistinguishability-based
(IB) censor for T and P is a function cens(·) that, for each
ABox A, returns a set cens(A) ⊆ clTCQ(A) such that there
exists an ABoxA′ for which (i) cens(A) = cens(A′) (in this
case we say that A and A′ are indistinguishable w.r.t. cens)
and (ii) T ∪ P ∪ A′ is a consistent FO theory.
Example 1 Let us now formalize more precisely the scenario
we have used for the examples in the introduction, by instan-
tiating our CQE framework. The TBox signature consists
of the atomic concepts Supplier, ProjA, and ProjB, denot-
ing the set of suppliers of the company, suppliers involved in
Project A and those involved in Project B, respectively, and
contains the axiomsProjA ⊑ Supplier andProjB ⊑ Supplier,
stating that each individual instance of ProjA or ProjB is also
instance of Supplier. Data protection is specified through the
policy P = {∀x.ProjA(x) ∧ ProjB(x)→ ⊥}. The following
functions are IB censors for T and P :
• cens1: given an ABox A, cens1(A) returns the set
clTCQ(APA) of BCQs, where APA is obtained from A
by removing the assertion ProjA(c), for each individual
c such that both ProjA(c) and ProjB(c) are in A (note
that for every ABox A, A and APA are indistinguish-
able w.r.t. cens1. Similarly in the following censors).
• cens2: given an ABox A, cens2(A) returns the set
clTCQ(APB ) of BCQs, where APB is obtained from A
by removing the assertion ProjB(c), for each individual
c such that both ProjA(c) and ProjB(c) are in A.
• cens3: given an ABox A, cens3(A) returns the set
clTCQ(Asup) of BCQs, where Asup is obtained from
A by adding the assertion Supplier(c) and removing
ProjA(c) and ProjB(c), for each individual c such that
both ProjA(c) and ProjB(c) are in A.
It is easy to see that an IB censor always exists, but, as Ex-
ample 1 shows, there may be many IB censors for a TBox
T and a policy P , and so it is reasonable to look for cen-
sors preserving as much information as possible. Formally,
given two IB censors cens and cens′ for T and P , we say that
cens′ is more informative than cens if: (i) for every ABox A,
cens(A) ⊆ cens′(A), and (ii) there exists an ABox A′ such
that cens(A′) ⊂ cens′(A′). Optimal censors are then defined
as follows.
Definition 2 Let T be a DL TBox and P be a policy. An IB
censor cens for T and P is optimal if there does not exist any
other IB censor for T and P that is more informative than
cens. The set of all the optimal IB censors for T and P is
denoted with OptIBCensT ,P .
Example 2 Among the censors of Example 1, cens3 6∈
OptIBCensT ,P , since both cens1 and cens2 are more infor-
mative than cens3. It can be then verified that cens1 and cens2
are the only optimal IB censors for T and P .
4 IB censors vs. CP censors
In [Cuenca Grau et al., 2015], a different notion of censor,
named confidentiality-preserving (CP) censor, has been pro-
posed. Intuitively, a CP censor establishes which are the
BCQs entailed by a TBox and a given ABox that can be dis-
closed without violating the policy. We report below the def-
inition given in [Lembo et al., 2019], which generalizes CP
censors to any languageL ⊆ FO, called the censor language.
Definition 3 [Confidentiality-preserving censor] Let T be a
DL TBox, P be a policy, and L ⊆ FO be a language.
A confidentiality-preserving (CP) censor in L for T and P
is a function cens(·) that, for each ABox A, returns a set
cens(A) ⊆ clT
L
(A) such that T ∪P ∪ cens(A) is a consistent
FO theory.
The notion of more informative censor previously given for
IB censors can be naturally extended to CP censors, and we
can thus define optimal censors also in this case.
Definition 4 Let T be a DL TBox, P be a policy, and L ⊆
FO be a language. A CP censor cens in L for T and P is
optimal if there does not exist any other CP censor in L for
T and P that is more informative than cens. The set of all
the optimal CP censors in L for T and P is denoted with
L-OptCPCensT ,P .
Example 3 Consider T and P as defined in Example 1. An
optimal CP censor cens4 in CQ for T and P is defined as
follows: given an ABoxA, cens4(A) returns the set of BCQs
obtained by removing from clTCQ(A) every query contain-
ing the atom ProjA(c), for each individual c such that both
ProjA(c) and ProjB(c) are in A.
We soon notice that cens4 is instead not an IB censor. In-
deed, consider the ABox A = {ProjA(c),ProjB(c)}. We
have that cens4(A) = {φ | φ ∈ CQ and T ∪ S |= φ}, where
S = {∃x.ProjA(x),ProjB(c)}. It is not hard to see that there
exists no ABox A′ such that A′ and A are indistinguishable
w.r.t. cens4 and T ∪ P ∪ A′ is consistent.
LetA be an ABox and cens be either an IB or a CP censor,
the set cens(A) is called theory of the censor cens for A.
The following theorem explains the relation between IB
censors and CP censors.
Theorem 1 Let T be a DL TBox and P be a policy. If cens
is an IB censor for T and P , then it is a CP censor inCQ for
T and P . The converse does not necessarily hold.
Proof. Let cens be an IB censor for T and P . Consider
an arbitrary ABox A. According to Definition 1, there exists
an ABox A′ such that cens(A) = cens(A′) and T ∪ P ∪
A′ is consistent. Since by definition cens(A′) contains only
sentences φ ∈ CQ logically implied by T ∪ A′ (i.e., BCQs
φ such that φ ∈ clTCQ(A
′)) and T ∪ P ∪ A′ is consistent,
we have that T ∪ P ∪ cens(A′) is consistent as well. Due
to the equivalence cens(A′) = cens(A), we derive that T ∪
P ∪ cens(A) is consistent. To conclude the implication part
observe that, by definition, cens(A) ⊆ clTCQ(A).
As for the converse, Example 3 shows that the CP censor
cens4 inCQ for T and P is not an IB censor for T and P .
We also notice that optimal IB censors are not necessarily
optimal CP censors in CQ. Indeed, consider Examples 1
and 3. We have that cens1 ∈ OptIBCensT ,P but, even if, as
shown by Theorem 1, it is a CP censor in CQ for T and P ,
cens1 6∈ CQ-OptCPCensT ,P (it is easy to see that cens4 is
more informative than cens1). We also know from Example 3
that the optimal CP censor cens4 in CQ for T and P is not
an IB censor, and thus cens4 6∈ OptIBCensT ,P . However, if
an optimal CP censor inCQ for T and P is also an IB censor
then it is an optimal IB censor for T and P , as stated below.
Corollary 1 Let T be a DL TBox and P be a policy. If
cens ∈ CQ-OptCPCensT ,P and cens is an IB censor for
T and P , then cens ∈ OptIBCensT ,P . The converse does not
necessarily hold.
Proof. Theorem 1 implies that the set IB of IB censors for
T and P is a subset of the set CP of CP censors inCQ for T
and P . Thus, since for a censor cens ∈ CQ-OptCPCensT ,P
there does not exists in CP a censor cens′ that is more infor-
mative than cens, such cens′ cannot exists in IB too.
As a counterexample for the converse, as said above, cens1
is in OptIBCensT ,P but not inCQ-OptCPCensT ,P .
Actually, the relation between the two optimality notions
of censor depends on the censor language adopted for the CP
censors. In particular, for GA, the set of the theories of the
optimal IB censors for a TBox T and a policy P coincides
with the set of the deductive closures clTCQ(·) of the theories
of the optimal CP censors inGA for T and P . This property
is formalized by the following theorem, which is crucial to
establish the complexity results of the next section.
Theorem 2 Let T be a DL TBox and P be a policy. Then,
ib cens ∈ OptIBCensT ,P iff there exists a CP censor
cp cens ∈ GA-OptCPCensT ,P such that, for each ABox A,
clTCQ(cp cens(A)) = ib cens(A).
Proof. (⇐). Suppose that there exists a CP
censor cp cens ∈ GA-OptCPCensT ,P such that
clTCQ(cp cens(A)) = ib cens(A) for each ABox A.
Observe that, since cp cens is an optimal censor in GA
for T and P , we have that (i) cp cens(A) = clTGA(A) for
each ABox A such that T ∪ P ∪ A is consistent (other-
wise, we easily get a contradiction on the optimality of
cp cens), and (ii) T ∪ P ∪ cp cens(A) is consistent for
each ABox A, where cp cens(A) can be seen as another
ABox. From the above considerations, and the fact that
ib cens(A) = clTCQ(cp cens(A)) holds by assumption for
each ABox A, we have that, for each ABox A, also the
following hold: (i) ib cens(cp cens(A)) = ib cens(A)
(i.e., A and cp cens(A) are indistinguishable w.r.t.
ib cens), and (ii) T ∪ P ∪ ib cens(A) is consistent
because T ∪ P ∪ cp cens(A) is consistent. This, to-
gether with the fact that ib cens(A) ⊆ clTCQ(A) for each
ABox A (since ib cens(A) = clTCQ(cp cens(A)) and
cp cens(A) ⊆ clTGA(A)), implies that ib cens is an IB
censor for T and P .
We now prove its optimality by way of contradiction. Sup-
pose, for the sake of contradiction, that ib cens is not an op-
timal IB censor for T and P , i.e., there exists an IB censor
ib cens′ for T and P such that ib cens(A) ⊆ ib cens′(A)
for each ABox A, and there exists an ABox A′ such that
ib cens(A′) ⊂ ib cens′(A′). Since ib cens′ is an IB cen-
sor for T and P , there is an ABox A′i such that A
′
i and
A′ are indistinguishable w.r.t. ib cens′ (i.e., ib cens′(A′) =
ib cens′(A′i)) and T ∪P∪A
′
i is consistent. Since by definition
ib cens′(A′i) ⊆ cl
T
CQ(A
′
i
), the following inclusions hold:
ib cens(A′) ⊂ ib cens′(A′) = ib cens′(A′i) ⊆ cl
T
CQ(A
′
i
).
By assumption, moreover, we know that
clTCQ(cp cens(A
′)) = ib cens(A′), and therefore
clTCQ(cp cens(A
′)) ⊂ clTCQ(A
′
i
). It follows that
cp cens(A′) ⊂ A′i, i.e., there is a ground atom ψ such
that ψ ∈ A′i and ψ 6∈ cp cens(A
′). But then, consider the
function cp cens′ with cp cens′(A) = cp cens(A) for each
ABox A such that A 6= A′ and cp cens′(A′) = clTGA(A
′
i
).
Clearly, due to the facts that cp cens is a CP censor in
GA for T and P and T ∪ P ∪ clTGA(A
′
i
) is consistent
(because T ∪ P ∪ A′i is consistent), we have that cp cens
′
is a CP censor in GA for T and P as well. Observe,
however, that cp cens(A) ⊆ cp cens(A) for each ABox
A, and cp cens(A′) ⊂ cp cens′(A′) = clTGA(A
′
i
). In
particular, the ground atom ψ is such that ψ ∈ A′i (and
thus ψ ∈ cp cens′(A′) = clTGA(A
′
i
)) and ψ 6∈ cp cens(A′).
Therefore cp cens′ is a CP censor in GA for T and P
that is more informative than cp cens, and this contradicts
the assumption that cp cens ∈ GA-OptCPCensT ,P , as
required.
(⇒) In the proof, we will make use of the following claim.
Claim 1 Let T be a DL TBox, P be a policy, and ib cens be
an IB censor for T and P . If ib cens ∈ OptIBCensT ,P , then
the following hold:
(i) ib cens(A) = clTCQ(A) for each ABox A such that T ∪
P ∪ A is consistent.
(ii) ib cens(A) = clTCQ(A
′) = ib cens(A′) for each ABox
A, where A′ is the ABox such that A and A′ are indis-
tinguishable w.r.t. ib cens and T ∪ P ∪ A′ is consistent
(such an ABox A′ is guaranteed to exists due to the fact
that ib cens is an IB censor for T and P).
Proof. Assume that ib cens ∈ OptIBCensT ,P .
Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that (i) does not
hold, i.e., there exists an ABox Ac such that ib cens(Ac) ⊂
clTCQ(Ac) and T ∪ P ∪ Ac is consistent. But then, con-
sider the function ib cens′ with ib cens′(A) = clTCQ(Ac)
for each ABox A such that A and Ac are indistinguishable
w.r.t. ib cens (obviously, ib cens′(Ac) = clTCQ(Ac) since
indistinguishability w.r.t. an IB censor for a DL TBox T
and policy P always forms an equivalence relation), and
ib cens′(A) = ib cens(A) for each ABox A such that A and
Ac are not indistinguishable w.r.t. ib cens. Observe that, for
each pair of ABoxesA1 andA2, we have thatA1 andA2 are
indistinguishable w.r.t. ib cens if and only if they are indistin-
guishable w.r.t. ib cens′. Furthermore, since ib cens is an IB
censor for T and P , and since T ∪ P ∪Ac is consistent (and
therefore also T ∪P ∪ ib cens′(A) = clTCQ(Ac) is consistent
for each ABox A such that A and Ac are indistinguishable
w.r.t. ib cens), it can be easily verified that ib cens′ is an
IB censor for T and P that more informative than ib cens
(in particular, ib cens(A) ⊂ ib cens′(A) = clTCQ(A) for
each ABox A such that A and Ac are indistinguishable w.r.t.
ib cens), thus contradicting the assumption that ib cens is an
optimal IB censor for T and P , as required.
As for (ii), letA be an arbitrary ABox. Consider the ABox
A′ such that A and A′ are indistinguishable w.r.t. ib cens
(i.e., ib cens(A) = ib cens(A′)), and T ∪ P ∪ A′ is consis-
tent. From (i), we derive that ib cens(A′) = clTCQ(A
′), and
therefore ib cens(A) = ib cens(A′) = clTCQ(A
′).
Suppose that ib cens ∈ OptIBCensT ,P . Consider the func-
tion cp cens with cp cens(A) = GA ∩ ib cens(A) for each
ABox A. In other words, for each ABox A, cp cens(A)
returns the set of all and only the ground atoms occur-
ring in ib cens(A). From the definition of cp cens and
from Claim (i), it is easy to see that clTCQ(cp cens(A)) =
ib cens(A) for each ABox A. We now prove that cp cens ∈
GA-OptCPCensT ,P .
Observe that, by the assumption that ib cens is an IB censor
for T andP , we have that ib cens(A) ⊆ clTCQ(A) (and there-
fore cp cens(A) ⊆ clTGA(A)) for each ABox A. Further-
more, for each ABox A, T ∪ P ∪ A′ is consistent (implying
that T ∪P ∪ ib cens(A) = ib cens(A′) is consistent), where
A′ is the ABox such thatA andA′ are indistinguishable w.r.t.
ib cens, and therefore, since cp cens(A) = GA∩ib cens(A)
for each ABoxA, we derive that T ∪P ∪ cp cens(A) is con-
sistent for each ABox A. Thus, cp cens is a CP censor in
GA for T and P .
We now prove its optimality by contradiction. Suppose, for
the sake of contradiction, that cp cens is not an optimal CP
censor in GA for T and P , i.e., there exists an optimal CP
censor cp cens′ in GA for T and P such that cp cens(A) ⊆
cp cens′(A) for each ABox A, and there exists an ABox
A′ such that cp cens(A′) ⊂ cp cens′(A′) (observe that,
by definition, an optimal CP censor in GA for T and P
always exists). Consider now the function ib cens′ with
ib cens′(A) = clTCQ(cp cens
′(A)) for each ABox A. Since
cp cens′ ∈ GA-OptCPCensT ,P and cl
T
CQ(cp cens
′(A)) =
ib cens′(A) for each ABox A, using the (⇐) shown before,
we derive that ib cens′ ∈ OptIBCensT ,P . Observe that: (i)
for each ABox A, we have that cp cens(A) ⊆ cp cens′(A),
ib cens(A) = clTCQ(cp cens(A)), and ib cens
′(A) =
clTCQ(cp cens
′(A)); (ii) there exists an ABox A′ such that
cp cens(A′) ⊂ cp cens′(A′), i.e., there is a ground atom
ψ such that ψ ∈ cp cens′(A′) and ψ 6∈ cp cens(A′).
From (i), however, we easily derive that ib cens(A) ⊆
ib cens′(A) for each ABox A. Furthermore, since for the
ABox A′ cp cens(A′) ⊂ cp cens′(A′), and since by def-
inition cp cens(A) = GA ∩ ib cens(A) for each ABox
A, we have that GA ∩ ib cens(A′) ⊂ cp cens′(A′).
Due to the fact that ib cens(A) = clTCQ(cp cens(A)) for
Algorithm 1: OptGACensor
input: a DL-LiteR TBox T , a policy P , an ABox A;
output: an ABox;
1) AT ← clTGA(A);
2) Th← ∅;
3) while AT is not empty do:
4) let α be the lexicographically first assertion in AT ;
5) AT ← AT \ {α};
6) if T ∪ Th ∪ {α} ∪ P is consistent then
7) Th← Th ∪ {α};
8) return Th;
each ABox A, we derive GA ∩ clTCQ(cp cens(A
′)) ⊂
cp cens′(A′). It is not hard to see that this lat-
ter fact implies that clTCQ(GA ∩ cl
T
CQ(cp cens(A
′))) ⊂
clTCQ(cp cens
′(A′)). In particular, the ground atom
ψ is such that ψ ∈ clTCQ(cp cens
′(A′)) and ψ 6∈
clTCQ(GA ∩ cl
T
CQ(cp cens(A
′))).
Thus, since as shown in the previous steps the following
equalities hold
clTCQ(GA ∩ cl
T
CQ(cp cens(A
′))) =
= clTCQ(GA ∩ ib cens(A
′)) = clTCQ(cp cens(A
′)) =
= ib cens(A′),
and since clTCQ(cp cens
′(A′)) = ib cens′(A′), we derive that
ib cens(A′) ⊂ ib cens′(A′). Therefore ib cens′ is an IB cen-
sor for T and P more informative than ib cens, and this con-
tradicts the assumption that ib cens ∈ OptIBCensT ,P , as re-
quired.
5 Query answering under optimal IB censors
In this section we study query answering under IB censors
over DL-LiteR ontologies. In particular, we consider entail-
ment of BCQs specified over the signature of the ontology.
A possible strategy for addressing this problem is to
choose only one IB censor among the optimal ones, and
use it to alter the answers to user queries. In the ab-
sence of a criterion for determining which censor is the
best for our purposes, the choice of the optimal censor is
made in an arbitrary way (like in [Biskup and Bonatti, 2007;
Cuenca Grau et al., 2013]). Towards the realization of
an optimal IB censor, we first provide the algorithm
OptGACensor (Algorithm 1), which implements a function
that, for every DL-LiteR TBox T and every policy P , corre-
sponds to an optimal CP censor inGA for T andP . Then we
explain how to use OptGACensor to establish BCQs entail-
ment under an optimal IB censor by exploiting Theorem 2.
The algorithm first computes the set AT of ground atoms en-
tailed by T ∪ A. Then, it iteratively picks a ground atom α
fromAT following the lexicographic order, and adds α to the
ABox Th if T ∪ Th ∪ α does not violate the policy P . The
following theorem establishes the correctness and complexity
of the algorithm.
Theorem 3 Let T be a DL-LiteR TBox and P be a pol-
icy. There exists a censor cens ∈ GA-OptCPCensT ,P such
that, for each ABox A, OptGACensor(T ,P ,A) (i) returns
cens(A) and (ii) runs in polynomial time in the size of A.
Proof. For each ABox A, the set Th returned by the algo-
rithm contains only assertions in clTGA(A), that is, it contains
only assertions in GA entailed by T ∪ A. Moreover, step 6
of the algorithm checks that Th is consistent with T and P .
Hence, according to Definition 3, the algorithm implements
a CP censor cp cens in GA for T and P . It is also im-
mediate to verify that cp cens is optimal. Indeed, suppose,
by way of contradiction, that there exists an ABox A and
a censor cp cens′ such that cp cens(A) ⊂ cp cens′(A) and
cp cens(A′) ⊆ cp cens′(A′) for every other ABox A′. This
means that there exists an assertion α ∈ clTGA(A) such that α
in cp cens′(A)\cp cens(A), but since α is not in cp cens(A)
then T ∪ cp cens(A)∪{α}∪P has to be inconsistent (step 6
of the algorithm), and so T ∪ cp cens′(A)∪P is inconsistent
too, which contradicts the fact that cp cens′ is a CP censor.
As for the complexity, note that the algorithm iterates on
the set of ABox assertions clTGA(A) by choosing an assertion
α and, in each iteration, it checks if T ∪ Th ∪ {α} ∪ P is
consistent. Clearly, the algorithm terminates since clTGA(A)
is finite. Moreover, the thesis follows from the fact that given
a DL-LiteR TBox, a policy P (i.e. a set of denial assertions),
and an ABox Th ∪ {α}, checking if T ∪ Th ∪ {α} ∪ P
is consistent can be done in AC0 w.r.t. to the size of
Th ∪ {α} [Lembo et al., 2015], that the set clTGA(A) can be
computed in polynomial time w.r.t. |A| and that its size is
polynomial w.r.t. to |A| as well.
From Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 it follows that, to es-
tablish if a BCQ q is entailed by T ∪ A under an optimal
IB censor for T and P , it is sufficient to verify whether
T ∪ OptGACensor(T ,P ,A) |= q, which can be done in
polynomial time in the size of A.
We note also that it is possible to implement different op-
timal IB censors (actually, every optimal IB censor) by mod-
ifying the order in which the ABox assertions from the set
clTGA(A) are selected by the algorithm.
Depending on the application at hand, the approach of
randomly choosing a censor may not always be consid-
ered appropriate [Cuenca Grau et al., 2013]. For this reason,
in [Lembo et al., 2019] the authors suggest to use a form of
skeptical entailment over (the theories of) all the optimal cen-
sors, i.e., they propose a CQE framework in which a query
has a positive answer if it is entailed by each optimal censor.
In the same spirit, we define the following decision problem.
Definition 5 Let T be a DL TBox, P be a policy, A be an
ABox, and q be a BCQ. IB-Entailment(T ,P ,A, q) is the
problem of deciding whether q ∈ cens(A) for every cens in
OptIBCensT ,P .
By exploiting Theorem 2 and the results given
in [Lembo et al., 2019], we can provide the following
theorem.
Theorem 4 Let T be a DL-LiteR TBox, P be a policy, A be
an ABox, and q be a BCQ. Then, IB-Entailment(T ,P ,A, q)
is coNP-complete in data complexity.
Proof. The result immediately follows from Theorem 2 and
from [Lembo et al., 2019, Theorem 6], which states that de-
ciding if T ∪ cp cens(A) |= q, for every cp cens in GA-
OptCPCensT ,P is coNP-complete in data complexity.
6 Approximating optimal IB censors
As stated in Theorem 4, IB-Entailment is in general in-
tractable in data complexity. Towards a practical approach to
CQE, in this section we consider a different entailment prob-
lem that approximates IB-Entailment, and we show that its
data complexity is in AC0 (i.e., the same complexity of eval-
uating FO queries over a database). The approximation we
propose consists in considering a non-necessarily optimal IB
censor whose theory, for every ABox, is as close as possible
to the theories of all the optimal IB censors.
Definition 6 [AIB censor and QIB censor] Let T be a DL
TBox, let P be a policy, and let cens be an IB censor for T
and P . We say that:
(i) cens is an approximation of the optimal IB censors (AIB
censor) for T andP if, for every cens′ ∈ OptIBCensT ,P
and for every ABox A, cens(A) ⊆ cens′(A);
(ii) cens is a quasi-optimal IB censor (QIB censor) for T
and P if cens is an AIB censor for T and P and there
exists no AIB censor cens′ for T and P that is more
informative than cens.
Example 4 The IB censor cens3 of Example 1 is a QIB cen-
sor for T and P (but cens3 6∈ OptIBCensT ,P ).
For QIB censors the following notable property hold.
Theorem 5 Let T be a DL TBox and let P be a policy. A
QIB censor for T and P always exists and it is unique.
Proof. First, observe that the “least informative” censor cens0
such that cens0(A) = ∅ for every ABoxA, satisfies condition
(i) of Definition 6. So, either cens0 is a QIB censor (i.e., it
satisfies condition (ii) of Definition 6), or there exists a more
informative AIB censor (satisfying such condition (ii)). This
implies the existence of a QIB censor (we recall that censors
can return infinite sets of BCQs).
Then, let us assume that there exists two distinct QIB
censors censa, censb for T and P . Then, there exists an
ABox A such that censa(A) 6= censb(A). Since censa, censb
are IB censors for T and P , let A1 be an ABox such that
censa(A1) = censa(A) and T ∪P ∪A1 is consistent, and let
A2 be an ABox such that censb(A2) = censb(A) and T ∪
P ∪ A2 is consistent. Since censa, censb are AIB censors for
T and P , for every cens′ ∈ OptCPCensT ,P , A1 ⊆ cens
′(A)
and A2 ⊆ cens′(A), and therefore, clTCQ(A1 ∪ A2) ⊆
cens′(A). Now observe that censa(A) ⊆ cl
T
CQ(A1),
censb(A) ⊆ clTCQ(A2) and censa(A) 6= censb(A). This im-
plies that either censa(A) ⊂ cl
T
CQ(A1 ∪ A2) or censb(A) ⊂
clTCQ(A1 ∪ A2). Let us assume, w.l.o.g., that censa(A) ⊂
clTCQ(A1 ∪ A2). Then, let cens
′
a
be the censor such that
cens′a(A) = cl
T
CQ(A1 ∪ A2) and cens
′
a(A
′) = censa(A′) for
every other ABox A′ different from A. Now, cens′
a
is an
AIB censor for T and P , since censa is an AIB censor for
T and P and, as shown above, clTCQ(A1 ∪ A2) is a subset of
the theory of every optimal IB censor for T and P over A
, and for the same reason clTCQ(A1 ∪ A2) is consistent with
T ∪P . Moreover, cens′
a
is more informative that censa, since
censa(A) ⊂ cens′a(A) (and censa(A
′) = cens′
a
(A′) for every
other ABox A′). Consequently, censa is not a QIB censor for
T and P , contradicting the hypothesis. This proves that the
QIB censor for T and P is unique.
Hereinafter, we denote with qib censT ,P the QIB censor
for T and P . Entailment of BCQs over QIB censors is then
naturally defined as follows.
Definition 7 Let T be a DL TBox, let P be a policy, letA be
an ABox, and let q be a BCQ. QIB-Entailment(T ,P ,A, q)
is the problem of deciding whether q ∈ qib censT ,P(A).
We now focus on the case of DL-LiteR TBoxes and prove
that, in this case, entailment of BCQs under QIB censors
is FO-rewritable. Formally, we say that QIB-entailment in
a DL L is FO-rewritable, if for every TBox T expressed
in L, every policy P and every BCQ q, one can effec-
tively compute an FO query qr such that for every ABox A,
QIB-Entailment(T ,P ,A, q) is true iff A |= qr. We call qr
the QIB-perfect reformulation of q w.r.t. T and P .
We prove FO-rewritability of entailment of BCQs under
QIB censors in DL-LiteR by exploiting a correspondence
between this problem and entailment of BCQs under IAR-
semantics for DL ontologies, which is indeed FO-rewritable
for DL-LiteR,den, i.e., DL-LiteR enriched with denial asser-
tions [Lembo et al., 2015]. We recall that the IAR-semantics
is an inconsistency-tolerant semantics that allows for mean-
ingful entailment also when the ABox contradicts the TBox
of an ontology (for instance, when A = {A(d), B(d), C(d)}
and T = {A ⊑ ¬B}). The IAR-semantics is based on the
notion of ABox repair (A-repair), which is a maximal subset
of the ABox that is consistent with the TBox (in our exam-
ple there are two A-repairs, R1 = {A(d), C(d)} and R2 =
{B(d), C(d)}). Then, entailment under IAR-semantics is
defined as follows: let T be a DL-LiteR,den TBox, A be
an ABox, and q be a BCQ, IAR-Entailment(T ,A, q) is the
problem of verifying whether T ∪ Riar |= q, where Riar is
the intersection of all A-repairs of O = T ∪ A, called the
IAR-repair of O (in our example,Riar = {C(d)}).
To establish the relationship between QIB-entailment
and IAR-entailment, we define secrets, which play in our
framework a role similar to minimal inconsistent sets in
inconsistency-tolerant query answering [Lembo et al., 2015].
Let T be a TBox, let P be a policy, and let A be an ABox.
We say that a set of ABox assertions S ⊆ clTGA(A) is a secret
in T ∪P∪A, if T ∪P∪S is inconsistent and for each assertion
σ ∈ S we have that T ∪P ∪S \{σ} is consistent. We denote
by secrets(T ,P ,A) the set of all the secrets in T ∪ P ∪ A.
We now provide the following key property.
Lemma 1 Let T be a DL TBox, let P be a policy, let A be
an ABox, and let q be a BCQ. QIB-Entailment(T ,P ,A, q)
is true iff there exists a A′ ⊆ clTGA(A) such that:
(i) T ∪ A′ |= q;
(ii) A′ ∩ S = ∅, for each secret S ∈ secrets(T ,P ,A).
Proof. (⇐). We first show that given an ABox assertion
α ∈ clTGA(A), there exists an optimal IB censor cens ∈
OptIBCensT ,P such that α 6∈ cens(A) only if there exists
a secret S in secrets(T ,P ,A) such that α ∈ S. Suppose,
by way of contradiction, that α does not belong to any secret
in secrets(T ,P ,A). This means that cens(A) ∪ P ∪ {α}
is still consistent and so cens is not optimal, from which
the contradiction. Now, suppose that there exists an ABox
A′ ⊆ clTGA(A) such that: (i) T ∪ A
′ |= q; and (ii) there
is no secret S in secrets(T ,P ,A) such that A′ ∩ S 6= ∅.
Fromwhat shown above and from condition (ii), we have that
A′ ⊆ cens(A) for every cens ∈ OptIBCensT ,P . This means
thatA′ ⊆ qib censT ,P(A). Moreover, since T ∪A
′ |= q, we
have that T ∪ qib censT ,P(A) |= q, which shows the thesis.
(⇒). Suppose that QIB-Entailment(T ,P ,A, q) is true.
This means that q ∈ qib censT ,P(A). Since qib censT ,P
is an IB censor, then there exists an ABox A′ such that
qib censT ,P(A) = qib censT ,P(A
′) and T ∪ P ∪ A′ is
consistent (that is, A and A′ are indistinguishable w.r.t.
qib censT ,P ). Hence, T ∪ A
′ |= q. Moreover A′ ⊆
qib censT ,P(A) and thus A
′ ⊆ clTGA(A). So, A
′ satisfies
condition (i) of the lemma. As for condition (ii) we proceed
towards a contradiction. Suppose that there exists an ABox
assertion α ∈ A′ and a secret S ∈ secrets(T ,P ,A) such
that α ∈ S. From Definition 6, we have that A′ ⊆ cens′(A)
for every cens′ ∈ OptIBCensT ,P , and so, α ∈ cens
′(A) for
every cens′ ∈ OptIBCensT ,P . Since S \ {α} is consistent
with T ∪P , we have that S \{α} is not a secret in T ∪P∪A.
So it is possible to define an optimal IB censor whose theory
contains S \{α}, which is a contradiction, and soA′ satisfies
condition (ii) too.
The following theorem establishes the relationship be-
tween QIB-entailment and IAR-entailment.
Theorem 6 Let T be a DL-LiteR TBox, let P be a
policy, let A be an ABox, and let q be a BCQ.
QIB-Entailment(T ,P ,A, q) is true iff IAR-Entailment(T ∪
P , clTGA(A), q) is true.
Proof. Since T ∪A is consistent, then the secrets in T ∪P ∪
clTGA(A) coincide with the minimal subsets of cl
T
GA(A) that
are inconsistent with T ∪P . Therefore, the IAR-RepairR of
〈T ∪ P , clTGA(A)〉 is the set of ground atoms from cl
T
GA(A)
that do not belong to any secret in T ∪ P ∪ clTGA(A). Thus,
from Lemma 1 the thesis follows.
Theorem 6 actually states that, to solve QIB-entailment,
we can resort to the query rewriting techniques used to estab-
lish IAR-entailment given in [Lembo et al., 2015], provided
that we compute clTGA(A). We recall that query entailment
under IAR-semantics in a DL L is FO-rewritable, if for every
TBox T expressed in L and every BCQ q, one can effec-
tively compute an FO query qr such that for every ABox A,
IAR-Entailment(T ,A, q) is true iff A |= qr. The query qr is
called the IAR-perfect reformulation of q w.r.t. T .
To establish FO-rewritability of QIB-entailment in
DL-LiteR, however, we still need to address the above men-
tioned computation of clTGA(A), and turn it into an additional
query reformulation step. To this aim, we can exploit the
fact that, for a DL-LiteR,den ontology T ∪ A, an FO query
q evaluates to true over clTGA(A) iff q
′ evaluates to true over
A, where q′ is obtained by suitably rewriting each atom of q
according to the positive inclusions of T . Intuitively, in this
way we cast into the query all the possible causes of the facts
that are contained in the closure of the ABox w.r.t. the TBox
(similarly to what is done in query rewriting algorithms for
DL-Lite [Calvanese et al., 2007]).
To compute such a query q′, we use the function
atomRewr(q, T ), which substitutes each atom α of q with
the formula φ(α) defined as follows (where A,B are atomic
concepts and R,S are atomic roles):
φ(A(t)) =
∨
T |=B⊑A B(t) ∨
∨
T |=∃R⊑A(∃x.R(t, x))∨
∨
T |=∃R−⊑A(∃x.R(x, t))
φ(R(t1, t2)) =
∨
T |=S⊑R S(t1, t2) ∨
∨
T |=S−⊑R S(t2, t1)
For example, if T = {A ⊑ C,B ⊑ C} and q =
∃x, y.C(x) ∧ P (x, y), then atomRewr(q, T ) returns the
query q = ∃x, y.(C(x) ∨ A(x) ∨B(x)) ∧ P (x, y).
The following lemma, whose proof can be immediately ob-
tained from the definitions of clTGA(·) and atomRewr(·, ·),
states the property we are looking for.
Lemma 2 Let T be a DL-LiteR,den TBox, let A be an ABox,
and let q be an FO sentence. Then Eval(q, clTGA(A)) =
Eval(atomRewr(q, T ),A).
We are now able to extablish FO-rewritability of QIB-
entailment.
Theorem 7 Let T be a DL-LiteR TBox, let P be a policy,
let q be a BCQ, and let qr be an FO sentence that is a IAR-
perfect reformulation of q w.r.t. the DL-LiteR,den TBox T ∪P .
Then, the FO sentence atomRewr(qr, T ) is a QIB-perfect
reformulation of q w.r.t. T and P .
Proof. Let the FO sentence qr be an IAR-perfect
reformulation of q w.r.t. the DL-LiteR,den TBox T ∪
P . Then, for every ABox A, IAR-Entailment(T ∪
P , clTGA(A), q) is true iff Eval(qr, cl
T
GA(A)) is true. Now,
from Lemma 2, it follows that, for every ABox A,
Eval(qr, cl
T
GA(A)) = Eval(atomRewr(qr, T ),A). And
since by Theorem 6, for every ABox A such that T ∪ A is
consistent, IAR-Entailment(T ∪ P , clTGA(A), q) is true iff
QIB-Entailment(T ,P ,A, q) is true, it follows that the FO
sentence atomRewr(qr , T ) is a QIB-perfect reformulation of
q w.r.t. T and P .
Since IAR-entailment is actually FO rewritable, as shown
in [Lembo et al., 2015], the above theorem proves the FO
rewritability of QIB-entailment forDL-LiteR TBoxes. More-
over, the above theorem identifies a technique for obtaining
the QIB-perfect reformulation of a CQ, based on a simple
combination of the IAR-perfect reformulation algorithm of
[Lembo et al., 2015] and the atomRewr reformulation de-
fined above. Therefore:
Corollary 2 Let T be a DL-LiteR TBox, let P be a pol-
icy, let A be an ABox, and let q be a BCQ. The problem
QIB-Entailment(T ,P ,A, q) is in AC0 in data complexity.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have studied the approach to controlled
query evaluation based on instance indistinguishability: we
have applied this approach to Description Logic ontologies,
we have studied its relationship with another confidentiality-
preserving approach, and we have established complexity re-
sults for this form of controlled query evaluation in the case
of DL-LiteR ontologies.
Notably, in this framework we have identified a tractable
and semantically well-founded notion of CQE that enjoys the
first-order rewritability property. We believe that this result
opens the way towards practical implementations of CQE en-
gines for DL ontologies and Ontology-based Data Access.
We are currently working to achieve this goal.
Another important future direction is a deeper study of the
user model. Our framework inherits from its predecessors a
relatively simple model, which assumes that the user knows
(at most) the TBox and all the query answers returned by the
system, and considers only the deductive abilities of the user
over such knowledge. This user model might need to be en-
riched to capture more realistic data protection scenarios.
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